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Abstract
We apply a physical based model to describe the clothes fashion
market. Every time a new outlet appears on the market, it can invade
the market under certain specific conditions. Hence, the “old” outlet
can be completely dominated and disappears. Each creator competes
for a finite population of agents. Fashion phenomena are shown to
result from a collective phenomenon produced by local individual im-
itation effects. We assume that, in each step of the imitation process,
agents only interact with a subset rather than with the whole set of
agents. People are actually more likely to influence (and be influenced
by) their close “neighbours”. Accordingly we discuss which strategy
is best fitted for new producers when people are either simply organ-
ised into anonymous reference groups or when they are organised in
social groups hierarchically ordered. While counterfeits are shown to
reinforce the first strategy, creating social leaders can permit to avoid
them.
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1
1 Setting the limits
”Fashions have changed”, ”in fashion”, ”old-fashioned” are phrases frequently
used in the street, on TV or in newspapers. But what fashion are we talk-
ing about? The fashion of ideas, artistic fashion or, more prosaically, dress
fashion? When we talk about fashion, do we consider it to be the result
of a creative process (either intellectual or industrial), or a method of com-
municating a certain ”way of life” which would correspond in economics to
the level of information? In this paper, fashion should be understood as the
way a creative process entails new behaviour in a set of consumers, inde-
pendently of the information structure. We apply the model to the clothes
fashion market. Every time a new outlet appears on the market, it can, un-
der certain specific conditions, invade the market. Hence, the ”old” outlet
can be completely dominated and disappears. Each creator competes for a
finite population of agents.
As is the case for the movie industry or the industry of industrial design,
fashion activity depends on the level of creativity of the designers. It also
depends on the level of public recognition of this creativity. Nike certainly
shares this assumption, paying Michael Jordan (a famous basket ball player
in the U.S.) 20 million dollars in 1992, for endorsing Nike running shoes.
Fashion does not improve either efficiency or the marginal utility of the
consumption. Clothes belong to a class of goods whose functional properties
are fundamental in their consumption. It is easy to understand why I need
to buy a dress, or a pair of jeans. It is harder to explain why I choose Adidas
shoes, or Levi’s jeans. Moreover, it seems very difficult for an economist to
explain why women ask for short skirts one year, long skirts the year after,
and then short skirts again the year after that. Some theoricians may talk of
erratic preferences, but the desire to be in fashion could justify Janssen and
Jager’s argument [1] that ”...in satisfying their need for identity, people may
change their behaviour without changing their preferences”.
In markets in general and the fashion market in particular, people are
interacting simultaneously, and constantly modifying their decisions. It is
very reminisence of the way atoms interact in inert matter. Galam and
Moscovici [2] built a model of group decision making to describe the dynamics
of competing effect in updating individual opinions. De Oliveira et al [3]
give some interesting applications of physic tools to study economic and
social problems has become more numerous. Social interactions certainly
play a major role in the understanding of fashion diffusion process. By social
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interactions, ”we refer to the idea that the utility or payoff an individual
receives from a given action depends directly on the choices of others in that
individual’s reference group, as opposed to the sort of dependence which
occurs through the intermediation of markets” (Brock and Durlauf 1995).
Hence, we postulate that a consumer maximises his utility when he is dressed
like everybody else in his peer group.
In this paper, we consider that fashion results from the desire both to
conform and to differentiate oneself from others. We also assume that prod-
ucts are disembodied, thus any agent can switch from one brand to another
without cost. Under these assumptions, we attempt to explain how, after a
certain number of steps, a common unique behaviour can emerge from a fi-
nite population with heterogeneous behaviour. We believe that the structure
and organisation of the market are strong factors in the diffusion of fashion.
The fashion sector has changed since the 1950s. A lot of studies show that
this sector was organised into a very simple system until the 1970s (creation,
production, distribution). Since the beginning of the1980s, the fashion sector
has developed into a quite complex and destructured system, with the emer-
gence of different levels of quality (”Fashion off the peg” and ”Luxury off the
peg”). The fashion industry now follows a rationale of ”filie`re”, which im-
plies a multiplication of brands (with a tough policy of brand protection),and
sales levels. This tough policy of brand protection actually coexists with a
high level of market piracy in the design-based industry. For a long time the
”legal market” fought hard against this illegal market. It seems that things
have recently changed: An explanation could be in terms of of social welfare.
Some recent analyses show how if the counterfeit industry were to disappear
it would leave the place open to criminal organization, which would clearly
be dangerous for the economy and for society. According to us, allowing
counterfeits can have positive externalities for the main brands. A high level
of piracy can be interpreted as a signal that the product is ”fashionable”.
In this sense, the illegal market becomes an advertising tool. The more a
brand is counterfeited, the more this brand will be seen by a wide public.
Multiplying the levels of quality can also be interpreted as an advertising
tool. The consumer side can be seen as a lattice, in which people have strong
cliquishness with their peers, in hierarchic social groups. Hence, the fashion
market seems to be extremely hierarchical both on the demand and on the
offer side.
Proving the existence of a dominant strategy for the creators could help to
explain why some fashion goods emerge, where others fail. In what follows,
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we assume that the aim of a new creator is to invade the fashion market.
In other terms, his product must become ”the fashion”. In this paper, we
compare the different strategies a brand can use to insure the widest diffusion
of its product with the minimum level of investment.We wish to explain why
the fashion ”filie`re” is currently so diversified and hierarchically organised,
why counterfeits can have positive externalities and why, therefore, creators
must influence social interactions by appropriate strategies and facilitate the
diffusion of their creation.
In part 2, we focus on a market within which people are anonymous,
with homogeneous characteristics.We apply the concept and techniques of
real space renormalisation group from Physics, in the line of Ma [4] to study
the fashion diffusion process within hierarchical structures. In particular, we
focus on the necessary conditions for a given brand to be sure to dress the
majority of people in a society.
In previous papers, Galam found that majority rule voting produces a
critical threshold to total power [5, 7]. The value of the critical threshold to
power is a function of the voting structure, namely the size of voting groups
and the number of hierarchical voting levels. We find here that when pro-
ducers consider consumers as simply being organised into ”reference groups”1
the presence of counterfeits can be helpful in invading the market.
This result is demonstrated in part 3 where we show that in the case
where consumers are anonymous, allowing counterfeits can be an efficient
tool to diminish the level of investment. In part 4, people are no longer
anonymous. They are organised into small groups, which can be interpreted
as classified social groups with heterogeneous characteristics. In this situa-
tion, people can recognise each other. We postulate that they are a priori
leaders (they ”make” the fashion) or followers. Every time a follower imi-
tates a leader, he becomes a leader himself. We show that invasive creators
can avoid counterfeits and minimise their sunk costs if they can identify
organised, hierarchic social groups within the society.
Part 5 deals with setting some quantitative conditions to invade a given
market with an already existing set of references groups and leaders. Last
part concludes.
1The ”reference group of an individual possibly includes all the agents whom ”social
psychologists” call significant others” [8] . They can be friends, relatives, neighbours,
partners in business and so on.
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2 From physics to fashion: The model
When sufficient agents in a consumer’s social network switch from one prod-
uct to another, the preferences of this consumer are assumed to follow. But
little is said about how this socialisation appears, although some authors
as McCauley, Rozin and Schwartz [9] speak about cultural transmission. In
what follows, we show how creators can generate social effects by making
useful investments, then use these effects to invest less.
At the beginning of the game, all the consumers wear a specific brand, let
us say A. In the next period, a new creator B emerges and decides to invade
the market. To this end, he makes classical investments such as advertising
campaigns, promotions, etc. Now, people can choose between two brands
(A and B), representing two tendencies in the fashion. We assume that each
individual wants to be in fashion. Reference groups can be seen as cells that
will produce common social behaviour. The investment made by the new
creator will be efficient if it is sufficient to allow a wide diffusion process.
At some stage, we consider all investments from both brands are stopped.
There, we denote by p0 the overall proportion of people wearing the B brand
and 1−p0 the corresponding proportion wearing the A brand. From these ini-
tial conditions we study the internal dynamics of spreading or disappearence
of the new brand B within the population. The underlying assumption is
that each individual wants to be in fashion. We believe that it is not be-
cause they have erratic preferences that people will switch from one fashion
good to another, but rather because the maximisation of their utility depends
on their level of belongingness to a reference group. Consuming the same
product as their peers or friends increases this feeling of belongingness.
To achieve this individual goal, we assume that each person goes through
a hierarchical imitation process. Each step of this process is related to a
reference social group that produces common social behaviour. Within this
framework, every reference group consists of the aggregation of other smaller
reference groups. Moreover, it is only when a local fashion is established
at one reference group level that the higher reference group level becomes
activated, as seen in Figure (1). Each increase in the reference group size is
referenced with a one time unit incrementation.
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Figure 1: Left: First level of reference group with X and O behaviors. Com-
mon behavior is not yet achieved. Middle: Common behavior has been
completed at first level reference group. X is associated to dark color and
O behavior to light color. Second reference group is activated. There com-
mon behavior not yet completed. Right: Second reference group is activated.
Common behavior has been completed
2.1 The anonymous in-fashion process
We start from an anonymous situation in which the in-fashion model is driven
solely by a simple individual motivation to be like the majority of the people
around. There exists no leader, no intrinsic advantage to one brand over the
other, only the majority effect counts. We assume the population dynamics
of fashion awareness to be go within a successive set of reference groups level
extending to some factor r where r is an integer which counts how many
persons are within the first level of reference groups. Then to simplify the
equations we postulate the rescaling of the reference group extension goes also
by a factor r. It means people go in fashion first according to a local majority
among r persons. Once this step is completed, the in-fashion process goes
up to include r groups of r persons each, i.e., by majority among r2 persons.
And so on up to include the whole population. For instance for r = 100 we
have 100 persons by first reference group level and then it jumps to includes
r2 = 10000 and reach r3 = 1000000, one million already after 3 levels.
To formalize above scheme we calculate the probabiliy p1 to have one
initial reference group of r persons to have a majority of people wearing the
B brand starting from a whole larger population with a p0 proportion of B
wearing. All configurations of r persons having from r persons wearing the
B brand down to m ones where m = r+1
2
for odd r and m = r
2
for even r
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add to yield a B majority. The case of equality between the numbers of A
and B wearing persons is attributed to the B new brand as a tip to novelty.
Accordingly having p0 at t = 0 leads to p1 at t = 1 with,
p1 = Pr(p0) (1)
where the function Pr determines the renormalized proportion of B wear-
ing persons. More generally, starting from one reference level n with a B
proportion pn leads to the new proportion pn+1 at level n+ 1 with,
pn+1 ≡ Pr(pn) =
l=n∑
l=r
r!
l!(r − l)!p
l
n(1− pn)r−l . (2)
Simultaneously the A proportion varies according to 1− pn+1.
2.2 The optimal investment threshold: the necessary
condition.
For a creator who wishes to invade the market, an investment
threshold exists, below which investing is useless, no matter what
the amount of investment. Investing more is also superfluous.
The optimal strategy consists in setting the right level of invest-
ment just above the threshold to enable the full market invasion
driven by the in fashion process.
To follow the dynamics of change in the density of B-dressed people we
need to study the fashion function Pr(pn) defined above in Eq.(2). One shape
is shown in Figure (2) for the case r = 101. From the Figure and Equation
(2) it is found that the renormalized in-fashion process produces a monotonic
flow towards either one of the two stable fixed points pD = 0 and pI = 1.
The first one corresponds to the total disappearance of the B brand with A
preserving its initial monopoly. At the other extreme pI represents a total B
invasion with the A brand totally evicted.
In between these two points there exists another one pc which is unstable
since it produces the monotonic flow towards either one of the two stable fixed
points. It defines the critical density below which the repeated extension in
the in-fashion process leads inexorably to the total disappearence of the B
brand. For any odd reference group size it is located at given by pc =
1
2
which
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Figure 2: The fashion function Pr(pn) for r = 101 as function of p. The
separator is located at 50% with the two attractors at 0 and 1.
gives the threshold to B invasion at exactly 50%. Starting from p0 < 50%
leads towards 0 while the flow leads to 1 for p0 > 50%. For instance in the
case of r = 101 we get the following series starting from p0 = 0.40, p1 = 0.02
and p2 ≃ 0 In the case of r = 51 we get the series is p0 = 0.40, p1 = 0.07 and
p2 ≃ 0.
Therefore the repeated in-fashion process produces the self-elimination of
any proportion of an initial B brand as long as p0 < 50%. To be completed
total disappearence only two reference levels are required. Getting closer to
the unstable fixed point increases slightly the number of required reference
levels. With p0 = 0.49 the series are p1 = 0.42, p2 = 0.5, p3 ≃ 0 and
p1 = 0.44, p2 = 0.21, p3 ≃ 0 and for respectively r = 101 and r = 51.
At this stage, the key issue to ensure full monopoly for the initial new-
comer brand is a huge investment to guarantee a starting in fashion process
with more than fifty percent of the population wearing its B brand. Any
value less does make the all investment pure waste with the total dispap-
pearence of the brand. Such a condition put the level of success at an almost
impossible task.
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3 Counterfeits as a strategic tool
When individuals on the consumer side are anonymous and sim-
ply organised into undifferentiated large size reference groups,
producers cannot recognise them. In this situation, allowing
counterfeits is a dominant strategy, which will implicitly share the
minimum level of investment needed to invade the whole market.
However, reaching a level below the threshold is just a waste of money.
To ignore the existence of a threshold level can yield to a quite expensive
strategy of penetration. On the other hand to pass the threshold is also
a waste of money. And moreover in the real world the exact value of the
treshold is unknow. This quite difficult situation in assessing the right level
of investment leads to view allowing counterfeits as a strategic attitude.
It can indeed help in pushing the initial penetration above the critical
threshold, for no extra cost. When individuals on the consumer side are
anonymous and simply organised into undifferentiated reference groups, pro-
ducers cannot recognise them. In this situation, the best strategy is to allow
counterfeits, which will implicitly share the minimum level of investment
needed to invade the whole market. Therefore, allowing counterfeits can be
a useful strategy when producers are facing an anonymous market, to avoid
a total waste of the initial investment.
For instance, considering an investment yielding some initial p0 < pc leads
as seen before to zero. At constrast allowing counterfeits to yield some q0
of persons wearing the counterfeits produces an effective proportion of B
wearing p0 + q0 such that now p0 + q0 > pc. In that case the B will invade
the market thanks to the counterfeits. Altough it does hold the one hundred
percent of the full market it does have make a profitable investment.
In this sense, counterfeits can be considered as a diffusion vector and
then, be a useful tool for lowering the threshold.
But this tool can also have dangerous effect. For example, the counterfeit
producer can invade the market, creators never know exactly until where the
counterfeits will invest, the presence of a high number of counterfeits can
make the brand less attractive for a certain part of the population. We will
now explore whether creators can use other tools to decrease the level of
initial investment.
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4 Imitating your neighbours: smaller size groups
We have already shown that invading a market can have a high cost, or/ and
be an inefficient strategy when the threshold is not reached. In this case,
creators may be tempted to allow counterfeits in order to decrease their level
of investment. However such a strategy does have also a high cost. On this
basis we suggest another strategic tool consisting in acting on the in-fashion
frame itself.
The idea is to modify the value of the unstable threshold which is instru-
mental in determining the all or nothing investment to invade or disappear
from a market. To shift the threshold from the 50% value towards a lower
value for the invader means to increase it to the in market brand. Splitting
the unstable threshold value into two different values implies to introduce
some asymmetry to favor the new coming brand. This can be done naturaly
since we already have introduced a bias in favor of the new brand. Indeed we
assume that given a reference group, in case of a tie, equal A and B wearing,
the in fashion process leads to choose the new brand as the tip for novelty.
However for large reference group sizes, the occurrence of a tie is very
rare and does not have much effect on the overall dynamics. At constrast
smaller reference groups will exhibit more often tie situations. Therefore to
implement our new strategy requires to decrease the reference size groups.
Such a change can be obtained by producing clear social signs to make people
able to recognize each other. We are suggesting taking out from anonymity
the imitating processes to turn it personalization. In others words make
people choose whom they wish to resemble. To make our task easier, we talk
about ”neighbours”.
4.1 From anonymity to neighbourhood
For a creator who wishes to invade the market but avoid coun-
terfeits, an optimal strategy consists in breaking down the size of
reference groups by a personalization of the in fashion process.
The smaller the reference groups, the lower the investment level.
Having find out where to act to produce a disymmetry in favor of the
incoming new brand, we now analyse our model in the case of maximum tie
effect which occurs at the smaller social group exhibiting a tie, a group of 4
persons. If at time t = 0, 3 or 4 people in the group are A-dressed ,then all
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Figure 3: The fashion function Pr(pn) for r = 4 as function of p. The unstable
fixed point is located at 23%.
the 4 people end up A-dressed at time t = 0 + 1 = 1. However if only 0 or
1 people are A-dressed, then all 4 people end up B-dressed. In case of a tie
with 2 A-dressed and 2 B-dressed, a bias in favour of novelty results in the
new brand B being adopted by the whole group. Accordingly putting r = 4
in Eq. (2) gives for the first reference group level in fashion result,
p1 = P4(p0) = p
4
0 + 4p
3
0(1− p0) + 6p20(1− p0)2 , (3)
at time t = 1, where as before p0 is the initial proportion of B brand-wearing
people at t = 0. The following three configurations {(2 A, 2 B), (4 A, 3B),
(0 A, 4 B)} leads to (0 A, 4 B). While the in fashion function P4(pn) still
have the two stable fixed points zero and one, the unstable fixed point is now
located at,
pc =
5−√13
6
≃ 0.23 , (4)
which put the threshold to B invasion at about 23%, a much lower value than
50% as shown in Figure (3).
At the same time to keep on the whole market the A brand must always
share more than 77% of the market. Starting from p0 < 23% leads towards
11
0 while the flow leads to 1 for p0 > 23%.
The above people, all locally (groups of four) wearing the same brand,
constitute the first level of the hierarchy reference groups denoted level 1.
Then the same in-fashion process is repeated, but now within reference
groups of 16 people each. Again, each whole reference group of 16 peo-
ple adopts the same brand, either A or B, according to a local majority rule.
A tie situation still yields a B brand choice. In terms of density the same
equation holds, with
p2 = p
4
1 + 4p
3
1(1− p1) + 6p21(1− p1)2 , (5)
since with the three types of configurations (8 A, 8 B), (4 A, 12 B), (0 A, 16
B) which can be noted as follows: 4{(2 A, 2 B), (1 A, 3 B), (0 A, 4 B)}.
Each additional increment of time increases the size of the reference group
with a new in-fashion process leading to an homogenisation on brand A or
B with the density at level n+ 1 given by
pn+1 ≡ P4(pn) = p4n + 4p3n(1− pn) + 6p2n(1− pn)2 , (6)
where pn is the proportion of B brand-wearing people at level n with the
following three configurations 4n{(2 A, 2 B), (1 A, 3B), (0 A, 4 B)}.
To illustrate the quantitative changes produced by the smaller size effect,
we first come back to the case of an intitial p0 = 0.40 which goes down to zero
within two reference group levels for r = 100 and r = 51. Now in the case
r = 4 not only the series does not go to zero but instead increases toward
one, i.e., the full market invasion with p1 = 0.53, p2 = 0.72, p3 = 0.93 and
p4 = 1. Only 4 reference groups levels are enough to total invasion. At the
fourth level only 96 people are involved instead of the one million after 3
levels in the case r = 100.
But now, as the threshold is at 23% we can follow what happens with
an initial investment accounting for instance to a B wearing proportion p0 =
0.25. we have the series p1 = 0.26, p2 = 0.28, p3 = 0.32, p4 = 0.38, p5 = 0.48,
p6 = 0.66, p7 = 0.89,and p8 = 1. Eight levels of reference groups are required
for a total invasion of the market. An initial value p0 = 0.30 yields p1 = 0.35,
p2 = 0.43, p3 = 0.58, p4 = 0.80, p5 = 0.97 and p6 = 1 reducing the number
of reference groups required to six.
One illustration of the different outcome resulting from breaking down
the neighborhood is shown in Figures (4, 5, 6, 7) for a total population of
64 persons with 21 dressing an X item and 43 a O item, X being the new
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one. Figure (4) shows the in-fashion process at work for one reference group
embodying at once the whole population of the 64 persons. The result is the
winning of the item O initially chosen by the majority.
Figures (5, 6, 7) shows the same initial population with now the existence
of 3 discrete reference groups with respectively 4, 16 and 64 people. Figure (5)
shows the introduction of the first level of neighboring reference group with
four persons each. X and O wearing are present on the left side. Common
behavior is completed on the right side with now 24 X and 60 O.
In Figure (6) new larger reference groups of 16 people each are activated
as shown on the left side. On the right side common behavior has been
completed with an equality between X and O, each item being chosen by 32
persons.. Figure (7) exhibits the last reference group which embodies the
whole population as shown on the left side. On the right side everyone is
wearing an X item. The opposite outcome of Figure (5 showing how the
creation of intermediate reference group levels has been able to reverse the
outcome of the in-fashion process.
We can now see why it is important for a brand to multiply quality
levels and forms of marketing in its ”filie`re”. This strategy could be seen
as a classical process of differentiation. The wider the scale of products, the
larger the set of potential consumers. But each level can be considered as a
specific means of being seen by one or more members of a reference group.
4.2 Organizing the ”filie`re”
For a creator who wishes to invade the market, an investment
threshold exists, below which investing is useless, no matter what
is the amount of investment. Investing more is also superflu-
ous. The optimal strategy consists in hierarchically organizing
the ”filie`re”.
At this stage, the key issue is to determine the number of reference
levels needed to ensure full monopoly for the initial newcomer brand in
the case of small group sizes. For large size, the threshold is at around
50% and the level number is very small but with huge number of people
involved. It is also worth to notice that increasing the size to a larger
group inceases the threshold value toward that value of 50%. For instance
we have pc = 0.35, 0.40, 0.42, 0.44, 0.45, 0.46, 0.46, 0.47 for respectively r =
6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20.
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Figure 4: One group of 64 persons whom 21 are X wearing and 43 are
O wearing on the left side. Common behavior is not yet achieved . The
in-fashion process has been completed on the right side where everyone is
wearing the O item shared by the initial majority.
We can now calculate analytically the critical number of reference group
levels nc at which pnc = ǫ with ǫ being a very small number. This determines
the level of confidence of the prediction of getting the whole market. One
way to evaluate nc is to expand the in-fashion function pn = Pr(pn−1) around
the unstable fixed point pc,
pn ≈ pc + (pn−1 − pc)λr , (7)
where λr ≡ dPr(pn)dpn |pc with Pr(pc) = pc. Rewriting the last equation as
pn − pc ≈ (pn−1 − pc)λr , (8)
we can then repeat the process to get
pn − pc ≈ (p0 − pc)λnr , (9)
from which we get the critical number of levels nc at which pn = ǫ. Taking
14
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Figure 5: Left: First level of reference group with four persons each. X and
O wearing are present. Right: Common behavior has been completed at first
level reference group with 24 X and 40 O.
the logarithm on both sides of Eq. (8) gives
nc ≈ − ln(pc − p0)
lnλr
+ n0 , (10)
where n0 ≡ ln(pc−ǫ)lnλr . As we are dealing with integers, we have to take the
integer part of Eq. (10). Putting n0 = 1 yields pretty accurate results.
5 The effective optimal threshold
As it may turn rather costly and complicated to modify both the size refer-
ence groups and the associated number of levels we now evaluate the following
strategic issue. Given n reference group levels of group size r, what is the
initial overall proportion of B wearing required to get everybody dressed in
B?
It is worth keeping in mind the fact that the dynamics for A and B are
not symmetric. Here, we focus on the in-fashion dynamics from the B point
15
XX
XX
OO
OO
XX
XX
OO
OO
XX
XX
XX
XX
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
XX
XX
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
XX
XX
OO
OO
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
XX
XX
XX
XX
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
XX
XX
Figure 6: Left: Left: Second level reference group is activated to include
groups of 16 persons each. Common behavior has not yet been completed.
Right: Common behavior has been completed with now 32 X and 32 O.
of view. To proceed, we invert Eq. (9) to obtain
p0 = pc + (pn − pc)λ−nr . (11)
This yields two new operative critical thresholds. The first gives the value
of initial market penetration below which B is sure to disappear from the
market. It is obtained from Eq. (10) by inserting pn = 0 and it yields
P nD,r = pc(1− λ−nr ) . (12)
In parallel, setting pn = 1 gives the second threshold P
n
I,r, above which
the B brand invades the whole market. Combining Eqs. (11) and (12) gives
P nI,r = P
n
D,r + λ
−n
r . (13)
which shows the appearance of a strategic domain for P nD,r < p0 < P
n
I,r. In
this region B neither disappears totally nor takes over the whole market.
There is a coexistence with pn being at equilibrium and neither 0 nor 1. This
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Figure 7: Left: Third and last level reference group is activated to include
the whole population of 64 persons. Common behavior has not yet been
completed. Right: Common behavior has been completed. The X wearing
won. To be compared with the right part of Figure (4) where the O wearing
did win.
is therefore a coexistence region in which both brands are present. No one
is sure of winning. However, as seen from Eq. (13), this coexistence region
shrinks as a power law λ−nr of the number n of hierarchical reference group
levels. Having a small number of these levels raises the threshold for total
invasion but simultaneously lowers the threshold for disappearence.
The above formulas are approximated, since we have neglected correc-
tions in the vicinity of the stable fixed points. However they give the right
quantitative behavior. To get a practical feeling of what Eqs. (12) and (13)
mean in terms of numbers, let us illustrate them for the case r = 4 where we
have λ = 1.64 and pc,4 = pc =
5−
√
13
6
. Considering 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 level refer-
ence systems, P nD,r is equals to respectively 0.41, 0.34, 0.30, 0.27 and 0.26. In
parallel P nI,r equals 0.18, 0.20, 0.21, 0.22 and 0.22. These series dramatically
emphasize the massive effect of the in-fashion process.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the different investment tools a creator
can use to invade a market, in other words to become the fashion. We use
the concept and techniques of real space normalisation group to study the
fashion diffusion process within hierarchical structures.We show that when
potential consumers are organised into large, anonymous groups producers
cannot recognize them. In this case, the level of investment making it pos-
sible to invade the market is certainly high, and it may be optimal to allow
counterfeits. But allowing counterfeits can also be a dangerous tool. We then
show that if creators could organize people into distinctive reference levels,
this would diminish the threshold and make it possible to avoid counterfeits.
Simmel [10] noted that the fashion market actually seems to be the joint
result of an imitation process and a search for differentiation. We show that
in creating different social leaders, producers enable consumers to differenti-
ate themselves from each other by imitating their closest social leaders. To
simplify our task, we have focused on the clothes fashion market. With slight
modifications, our results could be extended to other kinds of fashion such
as the fashion in research ideas, for example.
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